Categories: Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions

SANTOS-SANCHEZ v. U.S., 381 Fed.Appx. 419 (5th Cir. 2010)

Jesus Natividad SANTOS-SANCHEZ, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-40145.United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 15, 2010.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

George W. Aristotelidis, Law Offices of Jorge Aristotelidis, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (06-CV-153).

Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PER CURIAM:[*]

[*] Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

In Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated by ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2340, 176 L.Ed.2d 559 (2010), we held, inter alia, that the alleged failure of Jesus Natividad Santos-Sanchez’s attorney to warn him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel warranting coram nobis relief. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment mandates that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in Santos-Sanchez and remanded the case to us for further consideration.

We find that Padilla has abrogated our holding i Santos-Sanchez. We therefore vacate the district court’s denial of Santos-Sanchez’s petition for a writ of coram nobis and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Padilla.[1]

VACATED and REMANDED.

[1] We note that Santos-Sanchez’s deportation neither deprives the district court of jurisdiction nor renders his petition moot. See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding, in the context of a writ of habeas corpus, that a bar on re-admission following removal or deportation is a legally cognizable collateral consequence, and thus deportation did not render the petition moot).

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