No. 80-1753.United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
January 31, 1983. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 21, 1983.
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Elliott Moore, Deputy Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Sandra Williams, David Fleischer, N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
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Donald S. Shire, Associate Sol., Barbara E. Kahl, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae, Secretary of Labor.
Eric H. Nelson, Houston, Tex., for intervenor Teamsters Local No. 968.
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Brown Laboon, W. Robert Brown, Douglas R. Little, Houston, Tex., for respondent.
Bert N. Bisgyer, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae for Nat. Federation of the Blind.
Application for Enforcement of An Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
Before GARZA, TATE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
[1] In this case, before us now on rehearing, the National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of its order of April 24, 1980, 248 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1980), that the Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston (“Lighthouse”) recognize and bargain with the General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 968, of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (“Union”), which had been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of a production and maintenance unit of employees in the Lighthouse’s Workshop A. The Board found that the Lighthouse had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), by refusing to recognize the Union and by refusing to furnish the Union relevant wage and employment information concerning such employees. In an opinion of August 10, 1981, 653 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1981), another panel of this Court denied enforcement of the Board’s order, finding that the Board improperly asserted jurisdiction over the Lighthouse “employees” of Workshop A because those workers were “clients” whose relationship with the Lighthouse was rehabilitative rather than typically industrial. This opinion was subsequently vacated, 679 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1982), and the case reargued. On rehearing, we find that the Board’s determination that the commercial and business nature of the workers’ employment predominated over any rehabilitative goals was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. It follows that the Board correctly concluded that these workers were entitled to organize and bargain collectively within the meaning of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). We grant enforcement of the Board’s order. I.
[2] The Lighthouse is a nonprofit, charitable corporation[1]
which provides services to and carries on programs for individuals with visual impairments. Part of its activities include operating the workshop involved in this case. The Lighthouse’s activities are divided into five departments: social services,[2] volunteer services,[3] library and special services,[4] rehabilitation[5] and industrial. The first four departments provide services which are available to all blind persons in the Houston community.[6] These departments receive state, federal and private
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funding to support their operations.[7] They are also supported, in part, by the profits generated by the fifth department, the Industrial Division.[8]
[3] The Industrial Division consists of two diverse “workshops”: Workshop A, whose employees are the subject of the immediate dispute, and Workshop B.[9] Workshop B includes approximately 30 individuals who are severely handicapped in addition to being blind and who are not engaged in substantial production work for sale. These individuals, who are unable to be fully productive, are paid at least fifty percent of the statutory minimum wage and fall under the sheltered workshop certificate which the Lighthouse has received from the Department of Labor.[10] Some individuals in Workshop B, after training and rehabilitation, “graduate” to Workshop A. [4] Workshop A employs approximately 70 individuals, 90 percent of whom are legally blind and, in some cases, are also afflicted with other handicaps. Sighted workers, who may or may not be otherwise handicapped, perform maintenance work on the machines and equipment used in Workshop A. Workshop A, which is housed in a separate building at the Lighthouse, performs a variety of manufacturing functions including the production of felt-tipped pens, mops, and brushes, the bottling of disinfectants and detergents,[11] and the performance of subcontract work for private employers.[12] The Industrial Division is also involved in the distribution, for retail sale, ofPage 403
various non-manufactured products purchased in bulk from other workshops both inside and outside Texas.[13]
[5] Workshop A employees are all paid at least the federal minimum wage for their work. Variations above the minimum wage reflect differing levels of productivity.[14] All Workshop A employees, however, are required to meet a productivity standard, measured by the norm of sighted individuals performing comparable duties in competitive private industry. Employees who cannot meet these standards may be transferred to Workshop B. If productivity levels above these standards are maintained, individuals may receive merit increases above their hourly rate; if these increased levels are not sustained, the raises may be withdrawn. [6] Workshop A employees are covered by worker’s compensation, unemployment insurance, and hospitalization insurance, and receive pension rights and nine paid holidays per year. They also receive other benefits which vary according to tenure, including vacation and sick leave. [7] The employees work under production deadlines, and are compensated at time-and-one-half for overtime work. Employees are disciplined for, among other things, low production, improper job performance, excessive tardiness or absenteeism, and insubordination. Progressive discipline is employed, and terminations have been an infrequent result.[15] The disciplinary procedure moves from counseling to managerial discussion.[16] Failing these successive measures, a workers’ committee[17] considers the matter and can authorize disciplinary measures be taken, including suspension and termination.[18] The supervisors in Workshop A are, generally, former workers who have frontline responsibility to ensure that production needs are met, including responsibility to check time cards, to dock workers who are late, and to approve requests to leave work early or to not come in on a particular day.[19] [8] The Lighthouse has no formal program for placement of Workshop A employees, although some individuals are placed in private industry on an ad hoc basis. Over the years, approximately three to four individuals have been placed annually; approximately half of these workers subsequently return to work at the Lighthouse. A large proportion of the employee complement of Workshop A has worked at the Lighthouse for at least ten years and some for as many as twenty years.[20]Page 404
II.
[9] At issue is the propriety of the Board’s application of the National Labor Relations Act to Workshop A “employees.”[21] The NLRA, apart from providing explicit exclusions, none of which are herein applicable, offers little definition as to who are “employees” covered by the Act.[22] The Board, in considering the basic policies behind the Act, has wide discretion in adding flesh to the bare-bones definition of “employee” while determining the status of individuals whose statutory coverage is at issue. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). As a result, it is well established that our function on review is quite limited:
[I]n reviewing the Board’s ultimate conclusions, it is not the court’s function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board’s. . . [T]he Board’s determination that specified persons are “employees” under the Act is to be accepted if it has “warrant in the record” and a reasonable basis in law.[10] Id. at 130-31, 64 S.Ct. at 860-61. See Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304, 97 S.Ct. 576, 581, 50 L.Ed.2d 494 (1977). Accord, Cincinnati Association for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 78, 74 L.Ed.2d 75 (1982); Physicians National House Staff Association v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 1360, 67 L.Ed.2d 342
(1981). With this circumscribed standard of review, we turn to examine the Board’s determination that Lighthouse A workers fall within the Act’s purview as “employees.” [11] Our review of the recent Board decisions reveals that the Board’s exertion of jurisdiction over workshops has hinged upon an ad hoc determination of whether the essential nature of the workshop is “rehabilitative” or “typically industrial.” Compare Goodwill Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977) (jurisdiction declined), with Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (jurisdiction asserted) and Cincinnati Association for the Blind, 235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978) (jurisdiction asserted). It exempts those which serve a primarily rehabilitative or therapeutic function and asserts jurisdiction over those wherein business or economic characteristics predominate. In the immediate case, the Board concluded that Workshop A exhibited business and commercial over therapeutic traits. [12] The Lighthouse contends that in reaching this conclusion, the Board erred. It points to various aspects of Lighthouse “employment” in support of its position that Workshop
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A’s focus is upon rehabilitation, that the Workshop is not engaged in a typically industrial endeavor, and, consequently, that NLRA collective bargaining rights are incompatible with rehabilitation. In particular, the Lighthouse stresses: 1) the rehabilitation, counseling and other services offered the blind at its facilities; 2) the hiring practice, which offers employment to all who request it in accordance with handicap rather than “traditional” employment criteria; 3) the disciplinary practice and procedure, which emphasizes counseling, peer-committee evaluation, and skill accommodation, and which seldom results in traditional industrial discipline; and 4) the placement of Workshop employees in private industry.
[13] These asserted differences, however, do not persuade us that the Board abused its discretion in exerting jurisdiction. In assessing whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Board’s finding, we note that while, to some extent, Workshop A employment might differ from “typical industrial” employment, the record does not reveal these differences to be as marked as the Lighthouse paints them to be. The rehabilitative, counseling and other social services exist for the community as a whole. Workshop A employees avail themselves of these services, as members of the handicapped community, rather than as Lighthouse workers; they may only seek these services, however conveniently located, outside of working hours as may any handicapped individual. Although over half of Workshop A employees receive “work adjustment training” before beginning their employment, the record is clear that this training period is uncompensated, and that the participating individuals are neither considered to be part of Workshop A while in training nor included in the unit certified by the Board. [14] While the hiring practice may well provide employment to all visually handicapped job-seekers, thus providing opportunities in accordance with criteria and procedures at variance with the private sector norm, other Lighthouse practices mitigate these differences. It is undisputed that once employed in Workshop A the handicapped must be able to meet the same production standards as would sighted individuals. If these standards cannot be met, Workshop A employees are subject to discipline or “demotion” to Workshop B. Thus, while the Lighthouse may well be able to afford all blind workers a chance at remunerative employment — both to a degree and demonstrating a policy foreign to the general business community — continued Workshop A employment is contingent upon typical business criteria. [15] Similarly, while discipline at the Workshop might be both more counseling-oriented and less frequently meted out than in the profit-making sector, it is undisputed that the severest forms of discipline have been invoked for industrial infractions.[23] We also note that the counseling-skills accommodation-work committee procedure is not wholly unique to the Lighthouse as a sheltered workshop; analogous provisions for managerial discussion and grievance procedures are well-known to the profit-making sector. [16] Finally, the record shows that the placement efforts of the Lighthouse have been informal, ad hoc, and not all too successful. No placement staff or program exists; movement into industry occurs sporadically as the Lighthouse is informed of available positions; over half of the approximately three to four individuals placed each year return to Workshop A; and many individuals are employed at Workshop A for as many as 10 to 15 years, with some there for as long as 20 years. [17] In essence, then, the differences stressed by the Lighthouse in an effort to show the Board’s error, do not carry their purported weight once the record is examined. When so examined, the nature of Workshop A employment is distinguishable from that of the sheltered workshop in Goodwill Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977), over which the Board declinedPage 406
jurisdiction. In Goodwill Industries the Board found that “rehabilitation” activities and goals permeated the “employer-client” relationship, that productivity did not affect remuneration or tenure, that discipline was rarely invoked, that fifty percent of job openings were reserved for short-term training of individuals who would shortly move into the open market, and that a formal, full-time placement program existed. On the basis of these findings, as well as others, the Board concluded that in this “unusual employer-client relationship,” where the employer’s “primary objectives are the converse of a normal employer’s objectives — so much so that Goodwill might better be classified as a vocational clinic than as a viable entrepreneural concern,” “[t]o permit collective bargaining in this context is to risk a harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative process. . . .” 231 N.L.R.B. at 537. We cannot find, on the basis of the record before us, that the Board erred in distinguishing the case at hand from Goodwill Industries. And compare NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047, 95 S.Ct. 2665, 45 L.Ed.2d 700 (1975) (“Even if subsequent cases reaching the opposite result are truly indistinguishable, it is not our province to ensure an abstract and academic consistency in Board decisions.”).
[18] Having shown that the asserted differences from the industrial norm are not as great as claimed, we now turn our attention to uncontroverted evidence before the Board which shows unmistakably that Workshop A employees work under “commercial and business” conditions. The employees are compensated at or above the minimum wage. Merit increases are considered and given. Employees are disciplined for low productivity or other violations of rules and requirements of the workplace. The disciplinary procedures constitute in practical effect an employer imposed grievance procedure. The employees punch time clocks. They work under production deadlines and work the traditional forty hour workweek with time and a half for overtime as the Fair Labor Standards Act provides. They have a schedule of holidays. They accrue pension, vacation, medical, and unemployment benefits. Some of these benefits are based upon seniority. For many persons, Workshop A is a permanent employer as both the workers’ long tenure and low out-placement levels attest. The workshop operates at a fairly substantial profit and is not supported by public or private funds. Its extensive production and marketing activities further emphasize the nature of the working conditions and working environment of the Workshop A employees. These working conditions and this working environment are in dominant measure typical of working conditions and a working environment subject to collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, if the employees choose to bargain collectively. The panoply of working conditions and benefits which the Lighthouse has paternalistically given to Workshop A employees are the normal and usual grist for the mill of collective bargaining. [19] The above business and commercial characteristics of Workshop A employment lead us to conclude that the Board could properly find the individuals working therein to be “employees” within the meaning of the Act. The approach taken and the conclusion reached by the Board in this case is entirely consistent with the Board conclusion in Cincinnati Association for the Blind,235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978), enforced 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 78, 74 L.Ed.2d 75 (1982). I Cincinnati, the Board distinguished its decision to decline jurisdiction in Goodwill Industries of Southern California,
231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977), finding that the Cincinnati “workshop operation [was] significantly based on economic considerations” while “the single overriding purpose of the `employer-client’ relationship [in Goodwill] was rehabilitation.” In so concluding, the Board emphasized the same operational, productivity, compensation and marketing factors considered in the immediate case.[24] We can
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find no error in the Board’s determination that the factors present in the immediate case followed the Cincinnati
“economic,” rather than the Goodwill “therapeutic,” pattern.
The Industrial Division, unlike the other departments, is self-supporting. It does not receive the federal or state grants channeled elsewhere within the Lighthouse.
The National Industries for the Blind (NIB), a private, nonprofit corporation, which appeared as amicus curiae in the immediate case, consults with the President’s Committee on both the development of products and the establishment of the pricing structure under the Act. The NIB will also work with any workshop, in an advisory capacity, to assist in the development of its production capabilities. For its services, the NIB receives a 4% commission from the assisted workshop on all sales after the first year of production of the new product. NIB products carry the trademark “Skillcraft” and are not limited to sale to the federal government. At the Lighthouse, while most of the “Skillcraft” pens are sold to the federal government, some are sold in approximately 60 Houston, Texas convenience stores.
Employee performance is regularly evaluated by supervisors and by the Workshop manager at least once and usually twice a year.
breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause.”NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 313, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (emphasis in original); 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). While a greater proportion of nonprofit, charitable entities may not “affect commerce” than would that of profit-making enterprises, any such observation has no bearing on the specific case before us. The Lighthouse is engaged in extensive commercial activity, which more than amply supports the Board’s exertion of jurisdiction. Cf. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 681 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 856, 862, n. 11, 63 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) (“Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions `affect commerce’ under modern economic conditions”). Further, nothing in the statutes affecting the Lighthouse as a sheltered workshop, or in their legislative history, leads us to conclude that Congress intended to exclude sheltered workshops, such as the Lighthouse, per se from the National Labor Relations Act. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 214(c); The Wagner O’Day Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 46–48; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress has not indicated a “belief in the fundamental incompatibility of collective bargaining and any form of `therapy.'” Cincinnati Association for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567, 570-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 78, 74 L.Ed.2d 75
(1982). The sole issues before us, therefore, revolve around the question of whether the Board properly characterized the Lighthouse Workshop A workers as employees under the NLRA, and no exception in the statutes is applicable to this employer/employee relationship.
(1975), in addressing the paramount role played by the Board in interpreting the Act:
The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board. The Court of Appeals impermissibly encroached upon the Board’s function in determining for itself that an employee has no “need” for [an asserted right]. . . . It is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine whether or not the “need” exists in light of changing industrial practices and the Board’s cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management relations. For the Board has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,” . . . and its special competence in this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination. . . . Reviewing courts are of course not “to stand aside and rubber stamp” Board determinations that run contrary to the language or tenor of the Act. . . . But the Board’s construction here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it, and insofar as the Board’s application of that meaning engages in the “difficult and delicate responsibility” of reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management, the balance struck by the Board is “subject to the limited judicial review.”